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CREATIVE FIDELITY IN ACHANGING
WORLD
One of the earliest published writings that we have from the
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty is a review of Gabriel Marcells EIre
et Avoir. In his review Merleau-Ponty credits Marcel with the
remarkable achievement of having taught us all to see in a new way.1
This new way of seeing, succinctly stated, is a seeing in which the
seer remains concretely engaged with the subject matter, and hence
eschews the enticing but abstract objective view. Merleau-Ponty
used and considerably extended this new way of seeing in his own
distinctio~ between a thinking that remains informed by the structure
of perception, and a thinking in which 'the mind soars above and takes
an objective and general view of its subject.
In Marcells prolonged effort to understand the human
condition, it was the experience of the human body as "my body" that
became pivotal and prompted hirn to calillincarnate being the central
datum of metaphysical reflection". 2 His effort to be faithful to this
central datum has instilled in Marcells thinking a tension that
permeates the whole corpus of his work. It is a tension that arises from
his insistence upon the importance of the individual incarnate person
coupled with an equally strong insistence upon the need for an
ultimate context ("Ultimate Recourse") that grants lasting meaning to
the discourse among individuals. This tension, which is developed
and epitomized in the term creative fidelity, is, for Marcei, more than a
philosophical notion. It is the spiritual space wherein we live and learn
to trust one another.
The topic I wish to investigate in this paper is whether and
how the notion of creative fidelity, as developed in the philosophical
and dramatic works of Marcei, might be seen as a constructive force
1Maurice Merleau-Ponty, .. Eire el Avoir' in La Vie InleJlecluelle I 45
(Oct. 1936): 98-109.
2This is the title given to the. first essay in the collection Crealive
Fidelity, tr. Robert Rosthai (Noonday Press, New York: 1964).
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for responsible change. Can creative fidelity enable us to conserve
'and appropriate what has been achieved in the past and still enable us
to be open to the newness so treasured by the proponents of
progress? Can the adoption of the personal and political stance
described by the term creative fidelity help us to bridge the rhetorical
distance between those of us who fear change and those of us who
fear the fear of change?
To begin, I will briefly review and reflect upon some of the
central features of Marcel's notion of creative fidelity. Then I will
suggest several ways in which this richly complex notion might be
helpful for a contemporary understanding of change in politics,
science and the arts.
One way to approach the question of creative fidelity is by way
of Marcel's distinction between problem and mystery. Marcel uses the
name problem to designate that kind of question, or unease, that
allows a questioner to step back from the subject matter, to view it
objectively, and to see the full contours of the matter at hand. Such
problematic questions range from the trivial, IIHow many miles is it from
Chicago to Boston?", to such highly complex tasks as developing
sophisticated computer programs which can guide satellites into orbit
or simulate certain features of human mental activity.
We are also acquainted, however, with certain questions or
malters of unease that do not allow us as questioners to step back
from the matter of the inquiry. The subject matter itself sometimes
demands our immediate and sustained involvement as questioners.
If, for example, I ask IIWhat is the meaning of my life?" or if I ask
whether I have areal friendship with my spouse, or even if I want to
consider the personal meaning of my present effort to investigate the
sense of creative fidelity, I have to allow the question to invade my
own personal space, as it were; otherwise there can be no meaningful
answer to the inquiry. Marcel uses the term mystery to designate this
kind of question in which the very matter under investigation folds
back over the questioner and demands that he or she refuse any
clear-cut boundaries between hirn or herself and the matter for which
a possible resolution is sought. The structure of the inquiry must be
allowed to be formed by the kind of unease that seeks resolution. In
the abstract, many topics can obviously be approached either as
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problems to be solved or as mysteries to be probed. In the concrete
work of thinking, however, the kinds of inquiry, and what they can
accomplish, turn out to be very different, as iIIustrated by Marcel's well-
developed distinction between the body as thing and the body as
"my body."
~
Perhaps, at bottom, all acts of consciousness are synthetic
and involve, as Husserl argues in his Cartesian Me,ditations (#17), a
"belonging together inseparably" of elements that cannot be simply
identified with one another. If this is so, then the peculiar "belonging
together inseparably" that arises in our more personal acts, and which
Marcel takes to be the order of mystery, requires its own specific
investigation. In Marcel's descriptive analysis, the term mystery has
nothing esoteric about it. The term is used to describe concretely the
situation in which a person must, in order to remain truly personal,
resist the temptation to abstract from the Iived situation which always
presents itself as a kind of "unity-in-difference" with what is other than
oneself. It is these personal acts that constitute Marcel's realm of
mystery. These acts include not only acts of love and hate, prayer and
freedom, but also perception, memory, and feeling, when concretely
attended to and not denatured by an objective or abstract approach.
The term "creative fidelity", combining as it does the ideas of
creativity and faithfulness, of spontaneity and debt, expresses in
summary fashion a prolonged effort by Marcel to uncover 'the
ambiguous structure and fragile meaning of interpersonal relations.
At the same time the term expresses Marcel's plea that these
interpersonal relations be allowed to retain their experienced status
rather than be reduced to problems to be solved.
Quite understandably, the clarification of the concept of
creative fidelity in Marcel's thinking developed over aperiod of time,
and like most of the central motifs of his thought, came to birth first in
his dramatic works, and only later received express formulation in
philosophicallanguage. Typically in a Marcel play, the audience is led
into the ordinary lives of two, three or four persons; one or more of
these are, by reasons of choices they have made in the past, in some
way dramatically alienated either from themselves or from the others.
And typically the ending of the play leaves the resolution of the
conflict in doubt. That is, the possibility of future harmony or of
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eontinued eonfliet is left unresolved, dependent upon the freedom of
the individuals involved in the dramatic situation. Thus the audience,
too, is left with the task of struggling to understand how the situation
might resolve itself, left with the task of facing the issue of how and
whether life can go on. The only thing that is clear is that no one of
the characters can really live a full human life without deeply affecting
and being affeeted by others. A pervasive and profound unity-in-
differenee holds the charaeters together, whether in love or hate, or,
more often, in a nuaneed intermingling of both aeeeptance and
rejeetion.
The dynamie tension between self and other that is revealed
in a eonerete deseription in which personal relations are allowed to
retain their element of mystery, is manifest not only as a tension
between one person and another. It appears in all genuinely personal
human aets, and thus also in the way in whieh one relates or fails to
relate meaningfully to one1s own past or onels own future. There is
not only an objective past to my life, but also a mysterious aging.
Likewise, there is not only an objeetively possible future, but also the
human need to anticipate the future faithfully, that is, to trust that
some possible future will aetually be available. For this reason Marcel
argues for a close relation between fidelity and hope. Creative fidelity
has its place of application also in the task of integrating one truth or
meaning into a whole fife, whether the life of a single person or the life
of a community. In fact, the furthermost reach of creative fidelity, and
the most severe test of both the creativity and the fidelity, are found in
the effort to think and affirm a relation between the living and the
dead.
The particular force of ereative fidelity, both as an instrument
of evaluation and explanation, and as ahabit of life, will be lost if we
allow the idea of creative fidelity to be confused with eertain related
notions. Above all, creative fidelity must be set apart trom the notion
of eonstancy understood simply as the firm adherence to a position,
sueh as a moral code or a dogma that one has been taught or has
adopted. In contrast to sueh constancy, Marcel insists that when we
are genuinely and personally involved with others it is necessary to
maintain a degree of trust and respect tor the others, and that this
trust and fidelity is unthinkable apart from a eerlain spontaneity on our
part. Fidelity, thus understood, is always directed toward another
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freedorn; it is never directed toward oneself, nor toward sorne abstract
principle. Only if this fidelity is directed toward and attentive to the
personal presence of the other as person can it remain both faithful
and creatively responsive to the needs of the otherls freedom.
Fidelity implies a free or spontaneous faith in oneself which seeks the
spontaneity and trust of the other. Because it is a spontaneity that
exists only in the call to another spontaneity, this creative fidelity is
nothing less than a re-spontaneity that, when lived successfully,
manifests itself as responsibility.
The discovery that personal spontaneity is intelligible only as
responsibility, makes clear the tension that inhabits the idea of
creative fidelity. Nevertheless, it is evident that without the element of
my own personal freedom, and hence of my own personal presence,
there is no creativity. And without the element of faithfully heeding
and following the lead of the other, that is, without the element of my
being placed in meaning, radically, by the other, there is no fidelity. In
order to appreciate the full explanatory force of creative fidelity as an
intellectual tool it is necessary to give full play to both the creativity and
the fidelity.
If we do make room in our thinking for the exercise of the full
scope of each part of this complex term, it becomes clear, I believe,
that with the phrase creative fidelity Marcel is not merely describing a
factual situation. He is addressing a lived, interpersonal encounter
with a degree of concreteness that requires the reader to actually
enter, to some degree, into the realm of mystery if he or she is to be
able to cornprehend the meaning of the experience being described.
Thus even in the description of the structure of the encounter, the
tension implicit in creative fidelity seems to spill out of the purely
academic discourse and to make rather stringent demands upon
those seeking to understand it. To be efficacio.usly understood, the
idea of creative fidelity demands a kind of faith in 'the power of our
minds to go beyond their own particular truths to the truths of others,
and even to become intrigued by what Marcel has called the
"intelligible backgroundlt of all particular truths.
One pervasive feature of Marcells work, evident in both his
philosophy and his plays, is an intense conviction that there is
something profoundly out of order with our contemporary world. But
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this conviction is coupled with a reflective and determined refusal to
give up hope for our world. He refers to our world as "broken," and
gives one of his plays the title Le Monde CassB. Repeatedly he
laments the lack of reflection that seems to characterize our time and
that has made us nearly blind to, or at least suspicious of, any
explanatory effort other than the functional. Indeed, much of his work
can be seen as an attempt to uncover the roots of the brokenness of
our age, but this critique is persistently linked with the effort to restore
and bolster the conviction that it remains possible for us to create a
viable bond among people. During and beyond the two World Wars,
Marcel came to share deeply the contemporary mistrust of reason's
ability to discover or to establish such abond. Nevertheless, he is by
no means a prophet of doom. What is the wellspring of his hope?
One indication of the source of this hope can be seen, I think,
in the fact that Marcel sometimes uses the words hope and fidelity as
synonyms. This is especially the case when he speaks of the extreme
locus of fidelity, that is, fidelity in the face of death. Death, especially
the death not of oneself but of onels loved ones, appears to Marcel as
a kind of test of fidelity. Love, he notes, always refuses to believe in
the death of the beloved, even in the face of what appears as
conclusive objective evidence.
To understand the intimate connection between fidelity and
the experience of dying, we must recall that creative fidelity insistently
brings together the non-interchangeable character of my own
presence and the presence of personal otherness. Without my
personal presence (and this is not to be equated with the much-
criticized subjectivity) and without the presence of the other, I have no
entry into the human condition. My presence and that of the other
person dweil inseparably together and in their openness to one
another hold each other in existence. The test that the threat of
death brings to this openness is the test of the meaningfulness and
lovableness of the human person when the whole of my personal
presence or the whole of the personal presence of the beloved is
brought into question.
In one of the essays collected 'under the illuminating title
Homo Vistor, Marcel makes a distinction between IIservir" and "servir
a". He suggests that the latter phrase--to be serviceable, to be useful-
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-applies properly to things and to persons only when they are treated
functionally. He suggests that the former--to serve--might be best
illuminated by addressing the question IIWhom or what do you
serve?1I to someone whom we have come to know personally. He
goes on to say that if the person addressed would take "exception to
such a question he would actually prove, by that very fact, that the
deeper meaning of life had escaped hirn. It is clear, indeed, that aUlife
is a service."3
This bringing of the explanatory force of creative fidelity to
bear on the wholeness of a life gives us a powerful, if troubling, place
to relate the issue of creative fidelity to the theme of change in the
arts, politics and sciences. If one can follow Marcel's inquiry all the
way, and ask about the creative fidelity to the other when the whole of
experience is brought into question, one has found a locus of inquiry
where the possibility and structural meaning of change comes into
frontal contact, as it were, with 'the question of 'the meaning of the very
existence of politics, the arts, and the sciences. I am not suggesting
that Marcel's work gives ready answers to questions about the
ultimate meaning of politics, the arts and the sciences. I am, however,
proposing that his notion of creative fidelity provides an interpretive
space within which it makes sense to ask about the facticity of these
human ways of comportment, and not merely about the meaning in
this or that instance of their development. Fidelity can become, freely
rather than with physical or logical necessity, a responsible force for
change by making one attentive to the fact that there is a question
about the whole as weil as questions about the particular instances of
politics, arts and sciences.
What kind of appearance this creative force will have in any
community cannot be definitively forecast, but must be discovered in
the very effort to achieve a "politics of meaningll• 4 Its presence will, of
course, be all the more difficult to discern and to foster when a society
has become accustomed to limiting its political expectations to
functional expertise, and its hopes to a functional harmony
3Gabriel Marcei, Homo Viator, tr. Emma Craufurd (NY: Harper &
Brothers, 1962), 125-6.
41 accept the term, with gratitude, from Michael lerner, Editor and
Publisher of Tikkun.
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embedded in such political instruments of change as policies and
programs. Fair and effective policies and programs are surely
necessary, but they belong primarily to the order of means. Creative
fidelity invites reflection on the question of the suitability of our goals.
It invites us to think of a "politics of meaning" in terms of a renewal of
personal and communal presence, and renewal is not reducible either
to revolution or to reformation. In the political order, perhaps more
visibly than in the arts and sciences, the spilling over of the force of
creative fidelity from the realm of knowledge to that of action is
immediate. Fidelity, openly pursued, can provide assistance in the
often difficult task of keeping theory and practice firmly united.
Understanding the political order in terms of creative fidelity
would mean also an expectation of a certain tranquility and of a certain
maintenance of personal space, even in the functional worlds of
policies and programs. It would mean not only that the "personal is
politicalH as suggested by some philosophers of liberation, but also
that the political must remain personal. Thus it could give us a new
awareness of the importance and perhaps even the centrality of the
political action that is embedded in and manifested by the handshake,
by the embrace, and by our taking time to converse wi'th one another
without purpose other than to be neighborly.
The presence of creative fidelity as a force for change in the
arts and sciences could help to bring about an equally significant
renewal. The working out of possible ways for this renewal will be an
ongoing task and will not, of course, be a matter of producing
something that can be completed and marketed. It will ·rather be a
matter of creatively searching tor ways to integrate artistic and
scientific meanings into human existence without making either
science or the arts subservient to ideological dogmas. A beginning
might weil be the rejection of the idea that either the sciences cr the
arts have an autonomy apart trom the intelligible background which
continually and mysteriously encompasses the whole. In this regard,
it is necessary to acknowledge that there can be a totalitarianism of the
mind, and even a possible totalitarianism of the sciences and the arts,
that precedes and enlivens the totalitarianism we have come to know
in the political order.
At this point it is perhaps helpful to return to Marcel's
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distlnction between problem and mystery, and to notice that the
meaning of wholeness is utterly different in the two realms. The
wholeness proper to the problematic order is the wholeness of a
system; the danger inherent in this wholeness is that of the
manipulation of all truths and all possible forms of community. In the
order of the problematic, only those objects end ideas deserve to be
counted that can be made to stand up as present and identifiably
functional: policies and programs, technological skiffs and
achievements, cognitive science conceived as physics, systems of
moral rules, language games.
In the order of mystery, on the other hand, each individual in
the community manifests a wholeness deserving of respect. Each
other person stands before me, and stands within the political
economy, as one who is not really perceived but is rather abused if he
or she is treated only as a function of the political order or as apart of a
whole. And here I see no reason to give primacy to the negative
formulation of Emmanuel Levinas. The face-to-face encounter with
the other is surely not always and perhaps not even initially a meeting
under the command: "Thou shalt not kill".5 In the meaning revealed
by creative fidelity the other stands up as the one who is to be trusted
and admired. Furthermore, 'the meeting of the other is not a matter of
finding an other who is needed for the sake of my coming to my own
meaning and presence. The deeper meaning of the other as
manifested in the structure of creative fidelity is his or her own beauty
and wholeness. There is something both beautiful and revealing in
Marcells insistence that it is reflection upon the death of the IIbeloved
other" rather than reflection upon my own death, that is most
revealing of who we are as [political] persons. Remembering this, we
might be more careful about which version of the American dream we
choose to dream.
Whether a fidelity strong enough to build a viable bond
among humans at the end of this tumultuous century is possible
without commitment to an Absolute Thou may be a matter still to be
learned. Marcei, it is safe to say, did find it necessary to make such a
5Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, tr. Alphonso Lingis,
Duquesne Studies, val. 24 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne U. Pr.). See especially
"Ethics and the Face," 197-216.
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commitment, as did his American contemporary Josiah Royce. At this
time I wish to do no more than to raise the question of whether some
such commitment, even if largely inarticulate, is not required for an
efficacious human community. Work in this region of thought is
inherently fragile, and those working here are always in danger of
falling into a new dogmatism. Hence, the radical commitment to the
personal presence of the other human person that is revealed and
accomplished in the act of creative fidelity, is perhaps a first step
toward a rebirth of hope at a time when a significant portion of our
society has lost confidence in the political activity of governments. I
say perhaps a first step, because I am convinced that even this first
step must be made with an openness toward a more radical search for
meaning.6 Perhaps it is time to suggest that in political economy it is
precisely the more ultimate values that we find and hold for one
another that are in fact the nuts and bolts, as it were, which should
attract our daily attention and concern. How else explain our apparent
floundering in the questionable pursuit of ever-new experiences, and
amidst the accumulation of ever greater techniques of satisfaction?
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61 completely agree with Lawrence Cahoone's recent assessment that
there is a speciousness and more than a little deceit in the contemporary
search for consolation in the denial of ultimate questions. See his article
"The Consolation of Antiphilosophy: Scepticism, Common Sense
Pragmatism, and Rorty," Philosophy roday, 38(2) (Summer 1994): 204-224.
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